Simultaneous Elections in a Polarized Society make Single-Party Sweeps more likely
Speakers Name
Dr.Pradeep Dubey
About the speaker
Dr. Pradeep Dubey is Leading Professor and Co- Director, Center for Game Theory, Stony Brook University; and Visiting Professor, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University. He is Fellow of the Econometric Society and Charter Member of the Game Theory Society.
Affiliation
Leading Professor & Codirector Center for Game Theory Department of Economics Stony Brook University
Abstract
In a country with many elections, it may prove economically expedient to hold multiple elections simultaneously on a common polling date. Dr. Dubey will argue that in a polarized society, in which each voter has a preferred party, an increase in the simultaneity of polling will increase the likelihood of a single-party sweep, namely, it will become more likely that a single party wins all the elections.
Webinar link
Link to video